Fighting for Survival
I've been following the Ukrainian-Russian war since 2022. Most Western analyses favored the Russians to win because of their much bigger population and economy. Yet the Ukrainians continue to hold back the Russians and have recently shifted the momentum their way. How did the Ukrainians achieve this? The following are some of my imperfect observations.
The Importance of Productivity
Russia's population is ~5x that of Ukraine's, and its economy is similarly larger. Defenders have the advantage, but Ukraine needs to do more than defend to win. The obvious implication is that the Ukrainians must kill Russians relentlessly, produce more combat power per worker, and use that combat power more effectively.
The outcome of the war has global importance. Many countries support their favored side. Ukraine has the support of most industrialized, rich countries, while Russia relies on nearby autocracies. These outside actors can and do have large impacts on the fighting.
The victory formula for Ukraine is to develop better technology, manage its resources shrewdly, and leverage allies.
Allocating Scarce Resources
A famous saying is that a small Soviet Army can't beat a large Soviet Army. Tactics tend to be predictable and frontal, advantaging the larger force. A critical challenge for the Ukrainians at the beginning of the war was that roughly two-thirds of their army commanders still held onto Soviet beliefs. Not only were these commanders less effective, but if the army tried to maintain a certain number of men and weapons in each unit, then the poorly run outfits that wasted resources would hoover up recruits, weapons, and ammo. These commanders' wastage of human life in direct assaults has been one of the most pressing domestic political issues of the war. It deters recruits and encourages draft dodging. Effectively allocating resources was the first major task.
Manning the Brigades
A combination of politics, wartime pressure, and a lack of replacement leaders made command switches difficult. At first, the Ukrainians tried sending recruits to new units while letting the fielded units dwindle. The reviews were quite negative as the new units were ineffective. The next reforms involved the formation of larger units ("corps") made up of several formerly independent brigades. One good commander could then take on 3x-4x more soldiers. In addition, AWOL troops were allowed to return without penalty, and they could choose which unit to join. The most effective units that respected their soldiers could grow (especially with the larger corps structure) relative to the poor performers.
The same pressures that make bad commanders hard to replace also protected good commanders who ignored misguided orders from above. Coordinating larger force groupings is challenging, but foolish orders do not doom the entire Ukrainian Army at once.
Another key reform has been to move most drone pilots from the typical army command into the Unmanned Systems Forces under the competent leadership of Robert Brovdi. Increasing drone effectiveness (both combat and logistics) took pressure off the infantry.
These reforms are still incomplete. Complaints of hopeless frontal assaults and the creation of new brigades continue. The Ukrainian military's commander-in-chief still has some Soviet tendencies and siphons recruits to "Assault Infantry" units he has tighter command of. But there is uneven progress towards a more effective fighting force.
Supplying the Brigades
Adverse selection is also present in resupply for items like drones. There is extreme variance in drone team efficacy, and poorly performing teams waste limited resources.
The solution was a market and "currency" for units to buy equipment and supplies. Brigade-level units purchase drones directly from the manufacturers using the "Brave" marketplace. The currency in the marketplace is points that units earn from video-confirmed kills of Russians. Drones flow to the most effective units, those units work closely with the manufacturers, and they can choose from a range of options depending on their current mission and Russian tactics.
Elevating New Leaders
The Ukrainians have excelled at putting exceptional leaders in key positions despite many challenges in scaling human resources. A few examples are:
- Kyrylo Budanov, working his way up from a special forces leader in 2014 to the head of military intelligence in 2022 to the President's chief of staff in 2026.
- Alexander Kamyshin excelled at managing the train system under fire in 2022. He took over the rationalization of Ukraine's defense industry and helped to start many weapons programs that are now bearing fruit.
- Robert Brovdi began the war as a civilian grain trader and now leads Ukraine's unmanned systems forces, having pioneered many modern drone tactics on the way up from being an enlisted volunteer.
- Mykhailo Fedorov worked on digitizing the Ukrainian government before the war and recently became the defense minister. One of his first acts was to whitelist friendly StarLink terminals and deny StarLink service to Russian units. A more recent initiative has been a massive expansion in mid-strike drone capacity.
- Industrial leaders like FirePoint executives Denys Shtilerman and Iryna Terekh. FirePoint formed at the beginning of the war in 2022 and scaled production of Ukraine's most important ranged strike weapons (FP series).
Ukrainian Defense Production
Ukraine's domestic arms development has seen remarkable innovation and growth from a small base that might finally be reaching critical mass. There are several important areas of development.
FPVs
The dominant drone type for both sides is the FPV (first-person view) drone. They weigh only a few pounds and can fly 10-30 kilometers on scout or strike missions. The effectiveness of the drones depends on operator skill, communications, logistics, the concept of operations, control link reliability, avoiding production defects, and scale. Most of these drones are quadcopters, which significantly improve logistics by eliminating the need for dedicated launch infrastructure and simplifying flight controls. Performance can vary nearly an order of magnitude from the worst units and drones to the best.
The interesting thing about Ukrainian FPV production is the scale, distribution, and variety. The country might produce almost 7 million drones this year, yet they are not standardized. They come from dozens of manufacturers and many more unique models that constantly change. The competition and specialization are extreme. Such diversity probably would not be possible without the Brave marketplace.
Octocopters/Bombers
One area where Ukraine has dominated is large octocopter "bomber" drones. These have much larger payloads and ranges than FPVs, hence usually 8 propellers and motors. These specialize in flying deeper behind enemy lines to drop small bombs or mines. They can also provide logistics support for front line infantry. Starlink terminals usually handle communications to resist jamming.
These drones have played a key role in preventing the use of Russian armor near the front line.
Interceptors
Several years into the war, the Russians massively increased production of long-range one-way strike drones (commonly known as Shahed or Geran). The Russians also upgraded many models to fly higher and faster to avoid anti-air guns and patched defects that made the drones vulnerable to GPS spoofing. Traditional air defense could not counter such numbers, and the Ukrainians needed a new solution.
The answer ended up being oversized FPV "racing" drones adapted to intercept one-way attack drones and other mid-range drones, such as Lancet. Similar to FPVs, there are dozens of models and production ramped up in months. Now, most of the Shaheds the Ukrainians destroy are with interceptor drones rather than traditional missiles or guns.
Similar to Octocopters, the Russian versions of this technology are limited so far, but they are trying to scale within the "Rubicon" units.
Mid Range Strike
The biggest story in 2026 is the rise of Ukrainian mid-strike capability, roughly 30 km to 300 km beyond the front line.
The first development is the scaling of larger drones like the FP-2. FP-2s have a 100-200 kg payload, and pilots steer via satellite or other long-range connection. The main focus of attack has been air defense batteries and radars. Logistics and command-and-control targets are not far behind. These drones cost in the tens of thousands each and are for higher-value targets.
The second development is the proliferation of smaller drones that cost less than $10,000. These are almost always fixed-wing to gain range while still carrying a few kilograms of payload. The purpose is to attack trucks and other low-level logistics targets on roads far away from the front. The Russians are already trying to adjust by creating convoys with anti-aircraft gun escorts and moving shipments to nighttime.
On the other side, the Russians have long had weapons like Lancet that fill the high-end role and Molniya for the lower end. The Ukrainians have weathered this through a variety of tactical adjustments and the increasing effectiveness of interceptor drones. It seems likely the Russians will try to improve in this area after seeing the impact of the Ukrainian drones.
Deep Strike
Drones like the FP-1 are the backbone of Ukraine's deepstrike program. These vehicles are relatively slow and have payloads of around 30 kg. The smaller payload allows more fuel and ranges of 2500+ kilometers.
In previous years, the impact of these drones was more a moral victory than a strategic one. Russia shot down the vast majority of drones before they hit a target; accuracy wasn't always great, and the warheads were small. One drone hitting a tank in a refinery tank farm created a nice video, but didn't impact output.
In 2026, the number of drones is much higher, the accuracy is better, and seemingly, more drones make it through after the mid-strike campaign's attrition of Russian air defense. 7 or 8 drones hitting critical refinery units can increase repair times from hours to months. There are real impacts on refinery fuel production and the operations of other targets.
The Ukrainians also have more heavy cruise missiles, such as the FP-5 "Flamingo," ramping up production.
The risk for Russia is that its air defense and interception capability keeps degrading while Ukrainian production continues to rise, greatly increasing the impact from long-range strikes. Russia also has to make hard choices that its government may flub. They are reluctant to remove subsidies in the wake of gasoline shortages, instead issuing rationing cards and lowering fuel quality (which can damage vehicle engines over time). The pressure on the Russians is real if not (yet) decisive.
Coordination, Tactics, and Logistics
Maintaining communications and supplying the front line has been a constant struggle as drone warfare evolves.
Communications
SpaceX's Starlink quickly became one of the most important technologies for both sides. A phased-array antenna tracking a fast-moving satellite is difficult to jam or triangulate. The bandwidth allows video streaming from drone cameras, enabling commanders to coordinate fires directly and vastly shortening the time to call in strikes on targets. It also ensures smooth drone control where traditional radio links are poor.
Human control of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), octocopters, dynamically targeted mid-strike drones, and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) is nearly impossible without Starlink or similar technologies.
In early 2026, the Ukrainians worked with SpaceX to whitelist friendly modems and block those used by the Russians, conferring a large tactical advantage to the Ukrainians. The Russians are trying to use wifi repeaters instead, but they are not nearly as effective.
Drone-centric Defense
The Ukrainians clung to traditional infantry tactics into 2025, leading to greater losses than necessary. Trenches meant to protect infantry from artillery and armored vehicles fare worse against drones and glide bombs. Many fortifications were put in suboptimal locations and aided Russian advances.
Once drones hampered the usage of armor, there was little point to infantry trenches. Instead, soldiers hide and dig in in groups of 2-4 in tree lines and other terrain that provides visual cover. There are still defensive obstacles, but they are almost exclusively barbed wire, ditches, and other obstacles to slow down infantry and lighter vehicles like motorcycles. The longer drone teams have to prosecute enemy advances, the more effective they are in killing the attackers.
Logistics and Ground Robots (UGVs)
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) scaled in 2025 and are a dominant feature of the battlefield in 2026.
In 2024 and 2025, head-on attacks became less effective, and the strategy shifted towards attacking logistics on both sides. Units would have to retreat if the Russians compromised their supply lines. Driving a truck near the front became a very dangerous job.
UGVs filled the gap by delivering supplies and evacuating wounded soldiers. The attrition rate is still incredible; one UGV might only last 5-6 trips, but it is still more effective than humans driving trucks and vans.
The Ukrainians have armed some of these robots with machine guns, but that part of the technology is much less mature.
It took several years for UGVs to break out because the need was not as acute, and controls were suboptimal. It can take several operators to run one UGV, making them labor-intensive and at a disadvantage until supply runs became too dangerous for manned vehicles. Maintaining contact was fraught because the vehicles would lose radio links in the clutter. The answer ended up being Starlink, which always has an overhead view that is difficult to obstruct.
The Russians' loss of Starlink has given the Ukrainians an advantage in UGVs and front-line logistics.
The War at Sea
The Ukrainians have won their most decisive victories at sea. The Russian ships barely leave their ports and are regularly harassed. Meanwhile, Ukraine broke the early Russian blockade and has mostly normal seaborne trade to and from Odesa.
The key Ukrainian weapons are small sea drones, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs). They are almost like floating torpedoes and devastate unprotected ships. Some versions even have anti-air missiles to make helicopters think twice about intervening, or can launch FPV drones to attack nearby targets. Mid-strike FP-2 drones have also been effective against ships recently, damaging scores of cargo ships and tankers.
Keeping the sea lanes open while limiting Russian fleet movement has been a strategic gain for the Ukrainians.
Outside Assistance
"Neutral" powers have played a large part in the war by providing funding, weapons, components, expertise, and intelligence.
Early on, weapons from the US and Europe, like artillery and HIMARS missile launchers, played a critical role in turning back the Russians. Today, many of these weapons systems, especially related to air defense, are useful and highly sought after by the Ukrainians. But the gravity has shifted to domestic production.
That shift makes technical assistance and intelligence sharing much more valuable. One crack Western engineer improving drones produced in the millions of units per year can have a massive impact. Some drones, like the Hornet mid-range strike drone, are designed by Americans (with heavy input from Ukrainians). Similarly, help with targeting, route planning, and battle damage assessment for hundreds of thousands of strike drones per year can have a huge multiplier effect.
The EU is the primary financial and economic backer for Ukraine. Loans, energy trading, and other lifelines keep Ukraine in the fight even as Russia tries to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure and trade.
In essence, the West has found its comparative advantage in providing financial resources and information, while the Ukrainians specialize in defense production. Ukraine would lose the war without this symbiosis.
Long-Term Strategy and Ukrainian Victory
The upside is that Ukrainians have built a war machine that can grind down Russian forces and inflict serious damage to their combat power and economy. Some sources claim the kill-to-loss ratio is 8:1 in Russians to Ukrainians lost, up from only ~2:1 in previous years. Early in the war, Russia could correct some of its woes by eliminating severe underperformance compared to its theoretical capabilities. Now the Russians need to increase the theoretical ceiling, the tempo, and execute at a higher level to regain the upper hand. The Ukrainians would introduce a few copies of a new weapon before their full war industrialization, giving the Russians time to adjust. New weapons now come in the hundreds or thousands, dealing severe damage in the absence of immediate adjustment.
The downside is that Ukrainian strategic victory relies on a Russian collapse. The Ukrainians seem to lack the ability at this time to conduct a theater-wide, combined arms offensive with tactics and weapons adapted for drone warfare. It is a waiting game unless Ukraine's ability changes.
Restoring maneuver probably requires Ukraine to scale Unmanned Ground Vehicles with self-driving car-level intelligence and small, one-man armored personnel carriers. Some UGV models need effective kinetic drone defense. These units would take advantage of today's thinly manned lines while minimizing damage per sortie from drones, artillery, and mines.
A related problem the Ukrainians have fretted about since 2022 is how to keep citizens from leaving, even if there is a peace treaty. If the perception is that it is only a matter of time before Russia attacks again, then it isn't an attractive choice to stay in the country. Ukraine has to end the war with the upper hand and a viable economic program since foreign peacekeepers don't seem credible.
The continued growth of Ukraine's defense industry kills two birds with one stone. Battle-tested, affordable drone designs and training are in high demand worldwide, and Ukraine is the category leader. The country has already localized production of many subcomponents, opening up many other civilian markets, as well. Military and dual-use production can stay high while boosting economic growth.
Economic growth can improve through reforms to join the EU and move towards a Western economy and away from the Soviet legacy. Ultimately, Ukraine's war of independence is a test of whether it can modernize the country while under fire.
How Ukraine Built a War Fighting State
2026 July 10 Twitter Substack See all postsThe engine is revving after years of war.
Fighting for Survival
I've been following the Ukrainian-Russian war since 2022. Most Western analyses favored the Russians to win because of their much bigger population and economy. Yet the Ukrainians continue to hold back the Russians and have recently shifted the momentum their way. How did the Ukrainians achieve this? The following are some of my imperfect observations.
The Importance of Productivity
Russia's population is ~5x that of Ukraine's, and its economy is similarly larger. Defenders have the advantage, but Ukraine needs to do more than defend to win. The obvious implication is that the Ukrainians must kill Russians relentlessly, produce more combat power per worker, and use that combat power more effectively.
The outcome of the war has global importance. Many countries support their favored side. Ukraine has the support of most industrialized, rich countries, while Russia relies on nearby autocracies. These outside actors can and do have large impacts on the fighting.
The victory formula for Ukraine is to develop better technology, manage its resources shrewdly, and leverage allies.
Allocating Scarce Resources
A famous saying is that a small Soviet Army can't beat a large Soviet Army. Tactics tend to be predictable and frontal, advantaging the larger force. A critical challenge for the Ukrainians at the beginning of the war was that roughly two-thirds of their army commanders still held onto Soviet beliefs. Not only were these commanders less effective, but if the army tried to maintain a certain number of men and weapons in each unit, then the poorly run outfits that wasted resources would hoover up recruits, weapons, and ammo. These commanders' wastage of human life in direct assaults has been one of the most pressing domestic political issues of the war. It deters recruits and encourages draft dodging. Effectively allocating resources was the first major task.
Manning the Brigades
A combination of politics, wartime pressure, and a lack of replacement leaders made command switches difficult. At first, the Ukrainians tried sending recruits to new units while letting the fielded units dwindle. The reviews were quite negative as the new units were ineffective. The next reforms involved the formation of larger units ("corps") made up of several formerly independent brigades. One good commander could then take on 3x-4x more soldiers. In addition, AWOL troops were allowed to return without penalty, and they could choose which unit to join. The most effective units that respected their soldiers could grow (especially with the larger corps structure) relative to the poor performers.
The same pressures that make bad commanders hard to replace also protected good commanders who ignored misguided orders from above. Coordinating larger force groupings is challenging, but foolish orders do not doom the entire Ukrainian Army at once.
Another key reform has been to move most drone pilots from the typical army command into the Unmanned Systems Forces under the competent leadership of Robert Brovdi. Increasing drone effectiveness (both combat and logistics) took pressure off the infantry.
These reforms are still incomplete. Complaints of hopeless frontal assaults and the creation of new brigades continue. The Ukrainian military's commander-in-chief still has some Soviet tendencies and siphons recruits to "Assault Infantry" units he has tighter command of. But there is uneven progress towards a more effective fighting force.
Supplying the Brigades
Adverse selection is also present in resupply for items like drones. There is extreme variance in drone team efficacy, and poorly performing teams waste limited resources.
The solution was a market and "currency" for units to buy equipment and supplies. Brigade-level units purchase drones directly from the manufacturers using the "Brave" marketplace. The currency in the marketplace is points that units earn from video-confirmed kills of Russians. Drones flow to the most effective units, those units work closely with the manufacturers, and they can choose from a range of options depending on their current mission and Russian tactics.
Elevating New Leaders
The Ukrainians have excelled at putting exceptional leaders in key positions despite many challenges in scaling human resources. A few examples are:
Ukrainian Defense Production
Ukraine's domestic arms development has seen remarkable innovation and growth from a small base that might finally be reaching critical mass. There are several important areas of development.
FPVs
The dominant drone type for both sides is the FPV (first-person view) drone. They weigh only a few pounds and can fly 10-30 kilometers on scout or strike missions. The effectiveness of the drones depends on operator skill, communications, logistics, the concept of operations, control link reliability, avoiding production defects, and scale. Most of these drones are quadcopters, which significantly improve logistics by eliminating the need for dedicated launch infrastructure and simplifying flight controls. Performance can vary nearly an order of magnitude from the worst units and drones to the best.
The interesting thing about Ukrainian FPV production is the scale, distribution, and variety. The country might produce almost 7 million drones this year, yet they are not standardized. They come from dozens of manufacturers and many more unique models that constantly change. The competition and specialization are extreme. Such diversity probably would not be possible without the Brave marketplace.
Octocopters/Bombers
One area where Ukraine has dominated is large octocopter "bomber" drones. These have much larger payloads and ranges than FPVs, hence usually 8 propellers and motors. These specialize in flying deeper behind enemy lines to drop small bombs or mines. They can also provide logistics support for front line infantry. Starlink terminals usually handle communications to resist jamming.
These drones have played a key role in preventing the use of Russian armor near the front line.
Interceptors
Several years into the war, the Russians massively increased production of long-range one-way strike drones (commonly known as Shahed or Geran). The Russians also upgraded many models to fly higher and faster to avoid anti-air guns and patched defects that made the drones vulnerable to GPS spoofing. Traditional air defense could not counter such numbers, and the Ukrainians needed a new solution.
The answer ended up being oversized FPV "racing" drones adapted to intercept one-way attack drones and other mid-range drones, such as Lancet. Similar to FPVs, there are dozens of models and production ramped up in months. Now, most of the Shaheds the Ukrainians destroy are with interceptor drones rather than traditional missiles or guns.
Similar to Octocopters, the Russian versions of this technology are limited so far, but they are trying to scale within the "Rubicon" units.
Mid Range Strike
The biggest story in 2026 is the rise of Ukrainian mid-strike capability, roughly 30 km to 300 km beyond the front line.
The first development is the scaling of larger drones like the FP-2. FP-2s have a 100-200 kg payload, and pilots steer via satellite or other long-range connection. The main focus of attack has been air defense batteries and radars. Logistics and command-and-control targets are not far behind. These drones cost in the tens of thousands each and are for higher-value targets.
The second development is the proliferation of smaller drones that cost less than $10,000. These are almost always fixed-wing to gain range while still carrying a few kilograms of payload. The purpose is to attack trucks and other low-level logistics targets on roads far away from the front. The Russians are already trying to adjust by creating convoys with anti-aircraft gun escorts and moving shipments to nighttime.
On the other side, the Russians have long had weapons like Lancet that fill the high-end role and Molniya for the lower end. The Ukrainians have weathered this through a variety of tactical adjustments and the increasing effectiveness of interceptor drones. It seems likely the Russians will try to improve in this area after seeing the impact of the Ukrainian drones.
Deep Strike
Drones like the FP-1 are the backbone of Ukraine's deepstrike program. These vehicles are relatively slow and have payloads of around 30 kg. The smaller payload allows more fuel and ranges of 2500+ kilometers.
In previous years, the impact of these drones was more a moral victory than a strategic one. Russia shot down the vast majority of drones before they hit a target; accuracy wasn't always great, and the warheads were small. One drone hitting a tank in a refinery tank farm created a nice video, but didn't impact output.
In 2026, the number of drones is much higher, the accuracy is better, and seemingly, more drones make it through after the mid-strike campaign's attrition of Russian air defense. 7 or 8 drones hitting critical refinery units can increase repair times from hours to months. There are real impacts on refinery fuel production and the operations of other targets.
The Ukrainians also have more heavy cruise missiles, such as the FP-5 "Flamingo," ramping up production.
The risk for Russia is that its air defense and interception capability keeps degrading while Ukrainian production continues to rise, greatly increasing the impact from long-range strikes. Russia also has to make hard choices that its government may flub. They are reluctant to remove subsidies in the wake of gasoline shortages, instead issuing rationing cards and lowering fuel quality (which can damage vehicle engines over time). The pressure on the Russians is real if not (yet) decisive.
Coordination, Tactics, and Logistics
Maintaining communications and supplying the front line has been a constant struggle as drone warfare evolves.
Communications
SpaceX's Starlink quickly became one of the most important technologies for both sides. A phased-array antenna tracking a fast-moving satellite is difficult to jam or triangulate. The bandwidth allows video streaming from drone cameras, enabling commanders to coordinate fires directly and vastly shortening the time to call in strikes on targets. It also ensures smooth drone control where traditional radio links are poor.
Human control of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), octocopters, dynamically targeted mid-strike drones, and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) is nearly impossible without Starlink or similar technologies.
In early 2026, the Ukrainians worked with SpaceX to whitelist friendly modems and block those used by the Russians, conferring a large tactical advantage to the Ukrainians. The Russians are trying to use wifi repeaters instead, but they are not nearly as effective.
Drone-centric Defense
The Ukrainians clung to traditional infantry tactics into 2025, leading to greater losses than necessary. Trenches meant to protect infantry from artillery and armored vehicles fare worse against drones and glide bombs. Many fortifications were put in suboptimal locations and aided Russian advances.
Once drones hampered the usage of armor, there was little point to infantry trenches. Instead, soldiers hide and dig in in groups of 2-4 in tree lines and other terrain that provides visual cover. There are still defensive obstacles, but they are almost exclusively barbed wire, ditches, and other obstacles to slow down infantry and lighter vehicles like motorcycles. The longer drone teams have to prosecute enemy advances, the more effective they are in killing the attackers.
Logistics and Ground Robots (UGVs)
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) scaled in 2025 and are a dominant feature of the battlefield in 2026.
In 2024 and 2025, head-on attacks became less effective, and the strategy shifted towards attacking logistics on both sides. Units would have to retreat if the Russians compromised their supply lines. Driving a truck near the front became a very dangerous job.
UGVs filled the gap by delivering supplies and evacuating wounded soldiers. The attrition rate is still incredible; one UGV might only last 5-6 trips, but it is still more effective than humans driving trucks and vans.
The Ukrainians have armed some of these robots with machine guns, but that part of the technology is much less mature.
It took several years for UGVs to break out because the need was not as acute, and controls were suboptimal. It can take several operators to run one UGV, making them labor-intensive and at a disadvantage until supply runs became too dangerous for manned vehicles. Maintaining contact was fraught because the vehicles would lose radio links in the clutter. The answer ended up being Starlink, which always has an overhead view that is difficult to obstruct.
The Russians' loss of Starlink has given the Ukrainians an advantage in UGVs and front-line logistics.
The War at Sea
The Ukrainians have won their most decisive victories at sea. The Russian ships barely leave their ports and are regularly harassed. Meanwhile, Ukraine broke the early Russian blockade and has mostly normal seaborne trade to and from Odesa.
The key Ukrainian weapons are small sea drones, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs). They are almost like floating torpedoes and devastate unprotected ships. Some versions even have anti-air missiles to make helicopters think twice about intervening, or can launch FPV drones to attack nearby targets. Mid-strike FP-2 drones have also been effective against ships recently, damaging scores of cargo ships and tankers.
Keeping the sea lanes open while limiting Russian fleet movement has been a strategic gain for the Ukrainians.
Outside Assistance
"Neutral" powers have played a large part in the war by providing funding, weapons, components, expertise, and intelligence.
Early on, weapons from the US and Europe, like artillery and HIMARS missile launchers, played a critical role in turning back the Russians. Today, many of these weapons systems, especially related to air defense, are useful and highly sought after by the Ukrainians. But the gravity has shifted to domestic production.
That shift makes technical assistance and intelligence sharing much more valuable. One crack Western engineer improving drones produced in the millions of units per year can have a massive impact. Some drones, like the Hornet mid-range strike drone, are designed by Americans (with heavy input from Ukrainians). Similarly, help with targeting, route planning, and battle damage assessment for hundreds of thousands of strike drones per year can have a huge multiplier effect.
The EU is the primary financial and economic backer for Ukraine. Loans, energy trading, and other lifelines keep Ukraine in the fight even as Russia tries to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure and trade.
In essence, the West has found its comparative advantage in providing financial resources and information, while the Ukrainians specialize in defense production. Ukraine would lose the war without this symbiosis.
Long-Term Strategy and Ukrainian Victory
The upside is that Ukrainians have built a war machine that can grind down Russian forces and inflict serious damage to their combat power and economy. Some sources claim the kill-to-loss ratio is 8:1 in Russians to Ukrainians lost, up from only ~2:1 in previous years. Early in the war, Russia could correct some of its woes by eliminating severe underperformance compared to its theoretical capabilities. Now the Russians need to increase the theoretical ceiling, the tempo, and execute at a higher level to regain the upper hand. The Ukrainians would introduce a few copies of a new weapon before their full war industrialization, giving the Russians time to adjust. New weapons now come in the hundreds or thousands, dealing severe damage in the absence of immediate adjustment.
The downside is that Ukrainian strategic victory relies on a Russian collapse. The Ukrainians seem to lack the ability at this time to conduct a theater-wide, combined arms offensive with tactics and weapons adapted for drone warfare. It is a waiting game unless Ukraine's ability changes.
Restoring maneuver probably requires Ukraine to scale Unmanned Ground Vehicles with self-driving car-level intelligence and small, one-man armored personnel carriers. Some UGV models need effective kinetic drone defense. These units would take advantage of today's thinly manned lines while minimizing damage per sortie from drones, artillery, and mines.
A related problem the Ukrainians have fretted about since 2022 is how to keep citizens from leaving, even if there is a peace treaty. If the perception is that it is only a matter of time before Russia attacks again, then it isn't an attractive choice to stay in the country. Ukraine has to end the war with the upper hand and a viable economic program since foreign peacekeepers don't seem credible.
The continued growth of Ukraine's defense industry kills two birds with one stone. Battle-tested, affordable drone designs and training are in high demand worldwide, and Ukraine is the category leader. The country has already localized production of many subcomponents, opening up many other civilian markets, as well. Military and dual-use production can stay high while boosting economic growth.
Economic growth can improve through reforms to join the EU and move towards a Western economy and away from the Soviet legacy. Ultimately, Ukraine's war of independence is a test of whether it can modernize the country while under fire.